build.sh

@@ -1452,6 +1452,8 @@ EOF
         "${MOUNT_POINT}/usr/local/etc/rc.d/clawdie_live_wifi"
     install -m 0755 "${LIVE_SESSION_DIR}/clawdie-live-seed" \
         "${MOUNT_POINT}/usr/local/etc/rc.d/clawdie_live_seed"
+    install -m 0755 "${LIVE_SESSION_DIR}/clawdie-firstboot-rootpw" \
+        "${MOUNT_POINT}/usr/local/etc/rc.d/clawdie_firstboot_rootpw"
     install -m 0755 "${LIVE_SESSION_DIR}/clawdie-live-resolver" \
         "${MOUNT_POINT}/usr/local/etc/rc.d/clawdie_live_resolver"
     install -m 0755 "${LIVE_SESSION_DIR}/clawdie-live-audio" \
@@ -1878,6 +1880,7 @@ EOF
     set_config_line "${MOUNT_POINT}/etc/rc.conf" 'clawdie_live_gpu_nvidia_branch=""'
     set_config_line "${MOUNT_POINT}/etc/rc.conf" 'clawdie_live_wifi_enable="YES"'
     set_config_line "${MOUNT_POINT}/etc/rc.conf" 'clawdie_live_seed_enable="YES"'
+    set_config_line "${MOUNT_POINT}/etc/rc.conf" 'clawdie_firstboot_rootpw_enable="YES"'
     set_config_line "${MOUNT_POINT}/etc/rc.conf" 'clawdie_live_resolver_enable="YES"'
     set_config_line "${MOUNT_POINT}/etc/rc.conf" 'clawdie_live_audio_enable="YES"'
     set_config_line "${MOUNT_POINT}/etc/rc.conf" 'clawdie_live_power_enable="YES"'

live/operator-session/clawdie-firstboot-rootpw

@@ -0,0 +1,141 @@
+#!/bin/sh
+# Clawdie first-boot password gate.
+#
+# Forces the operator to set a root + operator (clawdie) password on the FIRST
+# boot, on the text console, BEFORE the GUI (sddm) and BEFORE the colibri daemon
+# autospawns an agent. Running before the daemon means the security decision is
+# always made before any agent can act — no cross-component interlock needed.
+#
+# Design:
+#   - Idempotent via a persistent success marker (/var is persistent on this
+#     image: varmfs="NO"). Marker present -> silent exit.
+#   - A countdown to ENGAGE (read -t). If the operator does not engage, boot
+#     continues with passwords UNSET and the gate re-prompts next boot (never
+#     bricks an unattended/headless boot). Once set, never prompts again.
+#   - Passwords are read with echo off (stty) and applied via `pw usermod -h 0`,
+#     which reads the new password from STDIN — never in argv/ps, never near the
+#     agent/LLM.
+#   - On success, writes /var/db/colibri/.secured so the colibri daemon can
+#     reflect security state to mother (label the node "unsecured" while absent).
+#     The daemon-side consumption of this marker is a separate (colibri) change.
+#
+# Functions below are sourced and unit-tested on a non-FreeBSD host with
+# CLAWDIE_ROOTPW_TEST=1 (which skips the rc.subr handoff). The interactive
+# countdown lives only in _start and is not exercised by the logic test.
+
+# PROVIDE: clawdie_firstboot_rootpw
+# REQUIRE: clawdie_live_gpu FILESYSTEMS
+# BEFORE: sddm colibri_daemon
+# KEYWORD: nojail
+
+if [ -r /etc/rc.subr ]; then
+    . /etc/rc.subr
+fi
+
+name="clawdie_firstboot_rootpw"
+rcvar="${name}_enable"
+start_cmd="${name}_start"
+stop_cmd=":"
+
+: "${clawdie_firstboot_rootpw_enable:=YES}"
+
+# Overridable for tests.
+SECURED_MARKER="${SECURED_MARKER:-/var/db/colibri/.secured}"
+PW_BIN="${PW_BIN:-/usr/sbin/pw}"
+ROOTPW_CONSOLE="${ROOTPW_CONSOLE:-/dev/console}"
+ROOTPW_COUNTDOWN="${ROOTPW_COUNTDOWN:-15}"
+ROOTPW_MIN_LEN="${ROOTPW_MIN_LEN:-8}"
+
+# --- pure logic (unit-tested) -----------------------------------------------
+
+# Already secured? (marker present)
+_rootpw_secured() {
+    [ -e "${SECURED_MARKER}" ]
+}
+
+# Validate a password pair. Echoes a reason and returns 1 on failure.
+_rootpw_valid() {
+    _p1="$1"; _p2="$2"
+    if [ -z "${_p1}" ]; then echo "empty password"; return 1; fi
+    if [ "${_p1}" != "${_p2}" ]; then echo "passwords do not match"; return 1; fi
+    if [ "${#_p1}" -lt "${ROOTPW_MIN_LEN}" ]; then
+        echo "too short (minimum ${ROOTPW_MIN_LEN} characters)"; return 1
+    fi
+    return 0
+}
+
+# Apply a password to a user. Reads the password from STDIN (pw usermod -h 0).
+_rootpw_apply() {
+    "${PW_BIN}" usermod "$1" -h 0
+}
+
+# Record success so the daemon sees a secured node and the gate stops prompting.
+_rootpw_mark_secured() {
+    mkdir -p "$(dirname "${SECURED_MARKER}")" 2>/dev/null || true
+    # mirror the daemon's ownership intent; best-effort (no-op under test).
+    chown colibri:colibri "$(dirname "${SECURED_MARKER}")" 2>/dev/null || true
+    chmod 0750 "$(dirname "${SECURED_MARKER}")" 2>/dev/null || true
+    : > "${SECURED_MARKER}"
+    chmod 0644 "${SECURED_MARKER}" 2>/dev/null || true
+}
+
+# --- interactive (console only; not unit-tested) ----------------------------
+
+# Prompt for one account, echo off, loop until a valid pair is applied.
+_rootpw_prompt_and_set() {
+    _user="$1"; _label="$2"
+    while :; do
+        stty -echo 2>/dev/null
+        printf '  %s password: ' "${_label}"; IFS= read -r _p1; printf '\n'
+        printf '  confirm %s: ' "${_label}"; IFS= read -r _p2; printf '\n'
+        stty echo 2>/dev/null
+        if _why="$(_rootpw_valid "${_p1}" "${_p2}")"; then
+            printf '%s\n' "${_p1}" | _rootpw_apply "${_user}"
+            _p1=; _p2=; _why=
+            printf '  -> %s password set.\n\n' "${_label}"
+            return 0
+        fi
+        _p1=; _p2=
+        printf '  ! %s — try again.\n' "${_why}"
+    done
+}
+
+clawdie_firstboot_rootpw_start() {
+    _rootpw_secured && return 0
+
+    # Talk to the operator on the system console.
+    exec < "${ROOTPW_CONSOLE}" > "${ROOTPW_CONSOLE}" 2>&1
+
+    # vt(4)/framebuffer may not have flushed right after the GPU rc script;
+    # settle and clear (terminfo-free) so the prompt is actually visible.
+    sleep 1
+    printf '\033[H\033[2J'
+
+    printf '================ FIRST BOOT — SECURE THIS NODE ================\n\n'
+    printf '  This stick boots with NO root password. Set one now.\n'
+    printf '  WRITE BOTH PASSWORDS ON PAPER — there is no recovery.\n\n'
+    printf '  Press ENTER within %ss to set passwords' "${ROOTPW_COUNTDOWN}"
+    printf ' (otherwise skipped) ... '
+
+    if IFS= read -r -t "${ROOTPW_COUNTDOWN}" _ans; then
+        printf '\n\n'
+        _rootpw_prompt_and_set root    "ROOT (admin)"
+        _rootpw_prompt_and_set clawdie "OPERATOR (clawdie)"
+        _rootpw_mark_secured
+        printf '  Node secured. Continuing boot...\n'
+        sleep 2
+    else
+        printf '\n\n  [skipped] passwords NOT set — this node remains OPEN.\n'
+        printf '  You will be prompted again on the next boot.\n'
+        sleep 3
+    fi
+    return 0
+}
+
+# On FreeBSD, hand off to rc.subr. Under test, skip so functions can be sourced.
+if [ -n "${CLAWDIE_ROOTPW_TEST:-}" ]; then
+    :
+elif command -v run_rc_command >/dev/null 2>&1; then
+    load_rc_config "${name}"
+    run_rc_command "$1"
+fi

tests/firstboot-rootpw-test.sh

@@ -0,0 +1,64 @@
+#!/bin/sh
+# Logic test for the first-boot password gate (clawdie-firstboot-rootpw).
+#
+# Exercises the testable security logic on any POSIX host: marker skip,
+# password validation, the secured-marker write, and — critically — that the
+# password is applied to `pw usermod <user> -h 0` via STDIN (never argv).
+# The interactive countdown (_start) needs a real console and is verified by
+# booting on osa, not here.
+set -u
+
+SCRIPT_DIR=$(CDPATH= cd -- "$(dirname -- "$0")" && pwd)
+GATE="${SCRIPT_DIR}/../live/operator-session/clawdie-firstboot-rootpw"
+[ -r "${GATE}" ] || { echo "FATAL: gate not found at ${GATE}" >&2; exit 2; }
+
+WORK=$(mktemp -d "${TMPDIR:-/tmp}/firstboot-rootpw.XXXXXX") || exit 2
+trap 'rm -rf "${WORK}"' EXIT INT TERM
+
+# Fake `pw`: records argv and the password read from stdin, so we can prove the
+# secret arrives on stdin and never on the command line.
+FAKEPW="${WORK}/fake-pw"
+cat >"${FAKEPW}" <<EOF
+#!/bin/sh
+printf '%s\n' "ARGV: \$*" >> "${WORK}/pw.calls"
+IFS= read -r _stdin_pw
+printf '%s\n' "STDIN: \${_stdin_pw}" >> "${WORK}/pw.calls"
+EOF
+chmod +x "${FAKEPW}"
+
+export CLAWDIE_ROOTPW_TEST=1
+export SECURED_MARKER="${WORK}/secured"
+export PW_BIN="${FAKEPW}"
+export ROOTPW_MIN_LEN=8
+
+# shellcheck disable=SC1090
+. "${GATE}"
+
+PASS=0; FAIL=0
+ok()  { PASS=$((PASS+1)); printf '  ok   %s\n' "$1"; }
+bad() { FAIL=$((FAIL+1)); printf '  FAIL %s\n' "$1"; }
+chk() { [ "$1" -eq 0 ] && ok "$2" || bad "$2"; }
+
+echo "== marker / idempotency =="
+_rootpw_secured; chk "$([ $? -ne 0 ] && echo 0 || echo 1)" "not secured when marker absent"
+_rootpw_mark_secured
+[ -f "${SECURED_MARKER}" ]; chk $? "mark_secured creates the marker"
+_rootpw_secured; chk $? "secured when marker present"
+
+echo "== password validation =="
+_rootpw_valid "goodpassword" "goodpassword" >/dev/null; chk $? "accepts matching >=8 char password"
+{ ! _rootpw_valid "" "" >/dev/null; };               chk $? "rejects empty"
+{ ! _rootpw_valid "abc" "abc" >/dev/null; };         chk $? "rejects too short"
+{ ! _rootpw_valid "password1" "password2" >/dev/null; }; chk $? "rejects mismatch"
+
+echo "== apply via stdin (secret never in argv) =="
+: > "${WORK}/pw.calls"
+printf '%s\n' "s3cret-on-stdin" | _rootpw_apply root
+grep -q 'ARGV: usermod root -h 0' "${WORK}/pw.calls"; chk $? "pw called: usermod root -h 0"
+grep -q 'STDIN: s3cret-on-stdin'  "${WORK}/pw.calls"; chk $? "password delivered on STDIN"
+{ ! grep -q 'ARGV:.*s3cret-on-stdin' "${WORK}/pw.calls"; }; chk $? "password NEVER appears in argv"
+
+echo
+echo "RESULT: ${PASS} passed, ${FAIL} failed"
+[ "${FAIL}" -eq 0 ] || exit 1
+exit 0